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Modeling Support for Role-Based Delegation
in Process-Aware Information Systems
The paper presents an integrated approach for the modeling and enforcement of
delegation policies in process-aware information systems. Based on a generic formal
metamodel, the detection of delegation-related conﬂicts is discussed and a set of
pre-deﬁned resolution strategies for these conﬂicts is provided. Moreover, a corresponding
UML extension, a prototypical proof of concept implementation, and a case study with
real-world business processes is provided.
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1 Introduction
A business process consists of a set of
tasks which are performed by an organization to reach certain corporate goals
(see, e.g., zur Muehlen and Indulska
2010). If the execution of a business process is supported via an information system, instances of a business process are
also referred to as workflows (see, e.g.,
Weske 2012). To support the secure execution of a particular workflow, subjects
participating in a workflow must own
the permissions that are needed to execute the corresponding tasks (see, e.g.,
Georgiadis et al. 2001; Oh and Park 2003;
Strembeck and Mendling 2011; Thomas
and Sandhu 1997; Wainer et al. 2003).
In recent years, role-based access control
(RBAC) (see, e.g., Ferraiolo et al. 2007;
Sandhu et al. 1996) has developed into
a de facto standard for access control in
research and industry. In RBAC, roles
are used to model different job positions and responsibilities within an organization and/or information system. Access permissions are assigned to roles according to the tasks each role has to accomplish. These roles are then assigned
to human users according to their respective work profile (see, e.g., Strembeck 2010). Roles are also used as an abstract concept for delegation (see, e.g.,
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Crampton and Khambhammettu 2008b;
Wainer et al. 2007) as well as for the
assignment of duties defined via obligations (see, e.g., Schaad and Moffett 2002;
Strembeck 2005; Zhao et al. 2007).
While authorization policies define a
subject’s permissions, obligation policies
define a subject’s duties (see, e.g., Cole
et al. 2001; Sloman 1994; Strembeck
2005). Delegation provides a mechanism
to increase flexibility in authorization
and obligation management. In essence,
a subject can delegate its tasks, duties, or
roles to another subject (see, e.g., Schaad
and Moffett 2002). Subsequently, the
subject receiving the delegation (the delegatee) will act on behalf of the delegating
subject (the delegator). Delegation has
been identified as an important concept
in workflow systems and many other application areas (see, e.g., Crampton and
Khambhammettu 2008c; Hasebe et al.
2010; Ravichandran and Yoon 2006).
In addition, we support the definition
of different types of entailment constraints. A task-based entailment constraint places some restriction on the
subjects who can perform a taskx given
that a certain subject has performed
tasky . Thus, task-based entailment constraints have an impact on the combination of subjects and roles who are
allowed (or required) to execute particular tasks (see, e.g., Russell et al. 2005;
Schefer et al. 2011; Strembeck and
Mendling 2010, 2011; Tan et al. 2004;
Warner and Atluri 2006; Wolter et al.
2008). In process-aware information
systems, mutual exclusion constraints
enforce conflict of interest policies by
defining that two or more tasks must be
performed by different individuals. Conflict of interest arises as a result of the
simultaneous assignment of two mutual
215
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exclusive entities (e.g., permissions or
tasks) to the same subject. In contrast,
binding constraints specify that bound
tasks must always be performed by the
same subject or role (see, e.g., Strembeck
and Mendling 2010, 2011; Tan et al. 2004;
Wainer et al. 2003). They can be subdivided into subject-based and role-based
constraints (see, e.g., Strembeck and
Mendling 2010, 2011).
The immanent complexity of delegations and task-based entailment constraints is a central problem for delegation in process-aware information systems (see, e.g., Crampton and Khambhammettu 2008a; Schaad 2001). Thus,
when delegating tasks, roles, or duties,
corresponding design-time and runtime
checks need to ensure the consistency of
the respective RBAC model. In particular,
at design-time conflicts may result from
delegations which are inconsistent with
the corresponding RBAC model, especially regarding related entailment constraints. At runtime, conflicts may result
from inconsistent task allocations.
The main contribution of this paper
is the consideration of delegation aspects
when checking and ensuring the consistency of process-related RBAC models. Our integrated modeling approach
for delegation policies and corresponding
processes acts as an enabler to document
and communicate more efficiently which
delegation aspects need to be considered when executing a certain process. To
achieve this, we consolidate and extend
our previous publications from Schefer
and Strembeck (2011b) and ScheferWenzl et al. (2012): Our approach is
based on a metamodel which formally
integrates the core elements of process models and delegation models for
roles, tasks, and duties (see Fig. 2). This
metamodel was presented in ScheferWenzl et al. (2012). Corresponding modeling support is provided by extending
the Unified Modeling Language (UML;
OMG 2011b). In particular, we introduced modeling support for delegating
roles, tasks, and duties in Schefer and
Strembeck (2011b) via extended UML2
activity diagrams. In Schefer-Wenzl et al.
(2012), we provide a set of algorithms
to detect and name potential delegationrelated conflicts. Moreover, these algorithms check and ensure the consistency of mutual-exclusion and binding
constraints in business processes in the
context of delegation.
We apply model-driven development
(MDD) techniques (see, e.g., Schmidt
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2006; Selic 2003; Stahl and Völter 2006)
to support the integrated modeling and
execution of delegation policies and business processes. In the MDD context, a
computation-independent model (CIM)
defines a certain domain (or subdomain)
at a generic level. The CIM is independent of a particular modeling language or
technology. A CIM can be used to build
a platform-independent model (PIM) of
the corresponding domain. While it is independent of any platform, and thereby
neutral from an implementation point
of view, the PIM is typically specified in
a particular modeling language (for example via MOF-based languages such as
BPMN or UML) and describes the structure of a system, the elements/results that
are produced by a system, or the control and object flow in a system. Finally, a platform-specific model (PSM)
describes the realization/implementation
of a software system via platform-specific
technologies and tools. In particular, we
chose a model-driven approach to separate the business/application logic from
the underlying platform technology (see,
e.g., Schmidt 2006; Selic 2003; Stahl and
Völter 2006).
In this paper, we consolidate the results
from Schefer and Strembeck (2011b) and
Schefer-Wenzl et al. (2012) and present
the following novel contributions: We
introduce a set of pre-defined resolution strategies for conflicts resulting from
the delegation of roles, tasks and duties in business processes. In addition, we
implemented all concepts introduced in
the formal metamodel and in the UML
extension as an extension to the BusinessActivity library and runtime engine
(available from BAL 2012). This extended
software platform enables a seamless
mapping between modeling-level specifications of processes, RBAC policies, and
delegation policies to the corresponding runtime models. Furthermore, we
conducted a case study to evaluate the
applicability of our UML extension for
real-world processes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we shortly
introduce terminology and present the
formal definitions of a process-related
RBAC delegation model at the CIM-layer.
Section 3 discusses different conflicts that
may occur when delegating roles, tasks,
or duties. Moreover, we provide corresponding conflict resolution strategies
that ensure the consistency of processrelated RBAC delegation models. Subsequently, Sect. 4 provides algorithms

to automatically detect the conflicts discussed in Sect. 3. Section 5 presents a
UML extension that allows to model
the delegation of roles, tasks, and duties
via extended UML2 Activity diagrams at
the PIM-layer. Section 6 presents a case
study to illustrate the practical applicability of our UML extension in real business
settings. Subsequently, Sect. 7 gives an
overview of our extended software platform to manage process-related RBAC
delegation models at the PSM-layer. Finally, Sect. 8 discusses related work and
Sect. 9 concludes the paper.

2 Process-Related RBAC
Delegation Models
Figure 1 shows a simplified credit application process visualized as standard
UML2 activity diagram which will serve
as a running example in this paper. When
executing this process, human users and
autonomous software agents have to fulfill certain tasks. Each task in a workflow
(such as checking a customer’s creditworthiness or negotiating a contract) is typically associated with certain access operations (e.g., to access the customer’s
record or to sign the contract, respectively). Thus, a subject participating in a
workflow must be authorized to perform
the tasks needed to complete the process (see, e.g., Georgiadis et al. 2001; Oh
and Park 2003; Strembeck and Mendling
2011).
In organizational contexts, tasks are
also associated with duties (see, e.g.,
Schefer and Strembeck 2011a). Each duty
defines an action that must be performed
by a certain subject in order to comply
with legal or organizational regulations
(see, e.g., Strembeck 2005). For example,
the task “negotiate contract” from Fig. 1
can be associated with the duty “fulfill pre-contractual information duties”
stemming from respective legal requirements. A subject responsible for performing this task and the associated duty
needs all necessary access permissions to
perform them (see, e.g., Strembeck 2005;
Zhao et al. 2007).
An organization’s business processes
and software systems are often modeled
via graphical modeling languages. However, corresponding organizational policies are often specified via informal textual descriptions (see, e.g., Recker et al.
2006). Thus, a link between tasks, duties, and subjects/roles is usually missing. This missing link can easily result
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Fig. 1 Credit application process modeled as standard UML2 activity diagram
in intransparencies and inconsistencies
between process descriptions and actual
process executions (see, e.g., Wolter et al.
2009). Especially in the case of delegation, where the original subject assignment is changed once or even more than
once (in case of multi-step delegation,
see, e.g., Barka and Sandhu 2000b), the
definition, monitoring, and actual enforcement of delegated tasks and duties
is difficult. Therefore, we propose an integrated modeling approach for business
processes and the delegation of roles,
tasks, and duties. Such an integrated
modeling approach also facilitates the
control and reporting on a company’s
fulfillment of compliance requirements.
Additionally, the integration also supports the elicitation and definition of
task- or duty-related constraints, such as
mutual exclusion or binding constraints.
2.1 Delegation in a Business Process
Context
In our process-related delegation model,
roles, tasks, and duties are delegable. In
essence, a subject can delegate the right
to perform a task and associated duties to
another subject. In case of a permanent
delegation, the delegation is valid for all
executions of a particular business process (e.g., a credit application process). In
case of a temporary delegation, it is only
valid for one process instance (e.g., Mr.
Mayer’s credit application process).
In the context of role-based access control, several delegation approaches use
the concept of so-called delegation roles
(see, e.g., Joshi and Bertino 2006; Shang
and Wang 2008; Zhang et al. 2003b). In
our delegation model, a delegation role
is created by the delegator and comprises
a set of delegated tasks and duties (similar to Zhang et al. 2003b). In this way,
Business & Information Systems Engineering

each duty is associated with a certain task
(see, e.g., Schefer and Strembeck 2011a).
A delegator can delegate all or a subset of
his/her delegable tasks, duties, or roles by
assigning them to a delegation role. Subsequently, delegation roles are assigned to
delegatees and can either be defined for
temporary or for permanent delegation.
Permanent delegation roles authorize the
delegatee to perform the delegated tasks
and duties in all instances of the process. In contrast, a temporary delegation
role (DRT) authorizes the delegatee to
perform the delegated tasks and duties
only in particular process instances. In
general, delegation roles and all assignments to delegation roles are managed
by the delegating subject. All other roles
are called regular roles (RR) and are usually managed by the security officer of
the respective company. Figure 2 visualizes the elements of the formal delegation
metamodel which will be integrated into
process-related RBAC models below (see
Definition 4 from Sect. 2.2).
Different kinds of entailment constraints can be defined on tasks to restrict
which subjects are allowed to execute a
particular task. In this paper, we focus
on mutual-exclusion and binding constraints. Static mutual-exclusion (SME)
and dynamic mutual-exclusion (DME)
constraints are used in workflows to enforce conflict of interest policies (see,
e.g., Botha and Eloff 2001; Casati et al.
2001; Strembeck and Mendling 2010,
2011; Tan et al. 2004; Wainer et al. 2003;
Warner and Atluri 2006). A SME constraint defines that two statically mutual exclusive tasks must not be assigned to the same subject. In turn, a
DME constraint defines that two dynamically mutual exclusive tasks must
not be executed by the same subject
in the same process instance. Moreover,
subject-binding (SB) and role-binding
4|2014

(RB) constraints can be defined which are
used to enforce process-related bindingof-duty constraints (see, e.g., Strembeck
and Mendling 2010, 2011). In particular,
a SB constraint defines that two bound
tasks must be performed by the same
individual. In turn, a RB constraint defines that bound tasks must be performed
by members of the same role, but not
necessarily by the same individual.
To ensure the proper enforcement of
entailment constraints, we also need to
consider these constraints in the context of delegation (see Sect. 4). For example, the delegation of tasks, duties,
or roles must not authorize the delegatee to perform two SME tasks. In contrast, when delegating a task which has
a subject-binding to another task, both
tasks have to be delegated to the same
subject. Otherwise, the subject-binding
constraint cannot be fulfilled.
2.2 Formal Metamodel for
Process-Related RBAC Delegation
Models
In this Section, we provide the formal
definitions for process-related RBAC delegation models at the CIM layer. For the
purposes of this paper, Definitions 1–3
summarize the definitions for processrelated RBAC models (for further details
see Strembeck and Mendling 2011). The
formal definitions then serve as a basis
for extending arbitrary process modeling
languages and process engines with support for process-related RBAC delegation
models. In this paper, we will demonstrate this by extending the UML (see
Sect. 5). Definition 1 specifies the essential elements of process-related RBAC
models and their basic interrelations. In
particular, we model authority via roles,
role-hierarchies, and task-to-role assign217
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Fig. 2 Conceptual overview: Main elements of process-related RBAC delegation models
ments. Responsibility is modeled via duties which are linked to tasks and assigned to subjects. Subjects and corresponding duties together form obligation policies. Competence is modeled via
role-to-subject assignments.
Definition 1 (Process-related RBAC
model) A Process-related RBAC Model
PRM = (E, Q, D) where E = S ∪ R ∪
PT ∪ PI ∪ TT ∪ TI refers to pairwise disjoint sets of the model, Q =
rh ∪ rsa ∪ tra ∪ es ∪ er ∪ ar ∪ pi ∪ ti
to mappings that establish relationships,
and D = sb ∪ rb ∪ sme ∪ dme to binding
and mutual-exclusion constraints, such
that:
• For the sets of the meta model:
– An element of S is called Subject.
S = ∅.
– An element of R is called Role. R =
∅.
– An element of PT is called Process
Type. PT = ∅.
– An element of PI is called Process
Instance.
– An element of TT is called Task Type.
TT = ∅.
– An element of TI is called Task
Instance.
• For the partial mappings of the meta
model (P refers to the power set):
1. The mapping rh : R → P (R) is
called role hierarchy. For rh(rs ) =

2.

3.

4.

5.

Rj we call rs senior role and Rj the
set of direct junior roles. The transitive closure rh∗ defines the inheritance in the role-hierarchy such
that rh∗ (rs ) = Rj∗ includes all direct and transitive junior-roles that
the senior-role rs inherits from. The
role-hierarchy is cycle-free, i.e. for
each r ∈ R : rh∗ (r) ∩ {r} = ∅.
The mapping rsa : S → P (R)
is called role-to-subject assignment.
For rsa(s) = Rs we call s subject and
Rs ⊆ R the set of roles assigned to
this subject (the set of roles owned
by s).
This assignment implies a mapping role ownership rown : S →
P (R), such that for each subject s all direct and inherited
roles
i.e. rown(s) =
 are included,
∗
rh
(r)
∪
rsa(s).
The mapr∈rsa(s)
ping rown−1 : R → P (S) returns all
subjects assigned to a role (directly
or transitively via a role-hierarchy).
The mapping es : TI → S is called
executing-subject mapping. For
es(t) = s we call s the executing
subject and t is called executed task
instance.
The mapping er : TI → R is called
executing-role mapping. For er(t) =
r we call r the executing role and t is
called executed task instance.
The mapping tra : R → P (TT ) is
called task-to-role assignment. For

tra(r) = Tr we call r role and Tr ⊆
TT is called the set of tasks assigned
to r.
This assignment implies a mapping task ownership town : R →
P (TT ), such that for each role r
the tasks inherited from its juniorroles
 are included, i.e. town(r) =
rinh ∈rh∗ (r) tra(rinh ) ∪ tra(r). The
mapping town−1 : TT → P (R) returns the set of roles a task is assigned to (directly or transitively via
a role-hierarchy).
6. The mapping ti : (TT × PI ) →
P (TI ) is called task instantiation.
For ti(tT , pI ) = Ti we call Ti ⊆ TI
set of task instances, tT ∈ TT is
called task type and pI ∈ PI is called
process instance.
7. The mapping ar : S → R is called
active role mapping. For ar(s) = r
we call s the subject and r the
active-role of s.1
8. Further, we allow the definition
of subject-binding, role-binding,
static mutual-exclusion, and dynamic mutual-exclusion constraints on task types. Related consistency requirements are specified
in Strembeck and Mendling (2011):
The mapping sb : TT → P (TT )
is called subject-binding. For
sb(t) = Tsb , we call t the subject
binding task and Tsb ⊆ TT the set of
subject-bound tasks.

1 We assume that each subject can (at the subject’s discretion) activate the roles that are directly assigned to this subject as well as the junior-roles of
its directly assigned roles (see, e.g., Ferraiolo et al. 1999; Sandhu et al. 1996)
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The mapping rb : TT → P (TT )
is called role-binding. For rb(t) =
Trb , we call t the role binding task
and Trb ⊆ TT the set of role-bound
tasks.
The mapping sme : TT →
P (TT ) is called static mutual exclusion. For sme(t1 ) = Tsme with
Tsme ⊆ TT , we call each pair t1 and
tx ∈ Tsme statically mutual exclusive
tasks.
The mapping dme : TT →
P (TT ) is called dynamic mutual
exclusion. For dme(t1 ) = Tdme with
Tdme ⊆ TT , we call each pair t1
and tx ∈ Tdme dynamically mutual
exclusive tasks.
Definition 2 provides rules for the
static correctness of process-related
RBAC models to ensure the design-time
consistency of the included elements and
relationships.
Definition 2 Let PRM = (E, Q, D) be
a Process-related RBAC Model. PRM is
said to be statically correct if the following requirements hold:
1. Tasks cannot be mutual exclusive to
themselves:
∀t2 ∈ sme(t1 ): t1 = t2 and
∀t2 ∈ dme(t1 ): t1 = t2
2. Mutuality of mutual exclusion constraints:
∀t2 ∈ sme(t1 ): t1 ∈ sme(t2 ) and
∀t2 ∈ dme(t1 ): t1 ∈ dme(t2 )
3. Tasks cannot be bound to themselves:
∀t2 ∈ sb(t1 ): t1 = t2 and
∀t2 ∈ rb(t1 ): t1 = t2
4. Mutuality of binding constraints:
∀t2 ∈ sb(t1 ): t1 ∈ sb(t2 ) and
∀t2 ∈ rb(t1 ): t1 ∈ rb(t2 )
5. Tasks are either statically or dynamically mutual exclusive:
∀t2 ∈ sme(t1 ): t2 ∈
/ dme(t1 )
6. Either SME constraint or binding constraint:
∀t2 ∈ sme(t1 ): t2 ∈
/ sb(t1 ) ∧ t2 ∈
/ rb(t1 )
7. Either DME constraint or subjectbinding constraint:
∀t2 ∈ dme(t1 ): t2 ∈
/ sb(t1 )
8. Consistency of task-ownership and
SME:
∀t2 ∈ sme(t1 ):
town−1 (t2 ) ∩ town−1 (t1 ) = ∅
Business & Information Systems Engineering

9. Consistency of role-ownership and
SME:
∀t2 ∈ sme(t1 ), r2 ∈ town−1 (t2 ),
r1 ∈ town−1 (t1 ):
rown−1 (r2 ) ∩ rown−1 (r1 ) = ∅
Definition 3 provides the rules for dynamic correctness of a process-related
RBAC model, i.e. the rules that can only
be checked in the context of runtime
process instances.
Definition 3 Let PRM = (E, Q, D) be a
Process-related RBAC Model and PI its
set of process instances. PRM is said to
be dynamically correct if the following
requirements hold:
1. In the same process instance, the executing subjects of SME tasks must
be different: ∀t2 ∈ sme(t1 ), pi ∈ PI :
∀tx ∈ ti(t2 , pi), ty ∈ ti(t1 , pi) : es(tx ) ∩
es(ty ) = ∅
2. In the same process instance, the executing subjects of DME tasks must
be different: ∀t2 ∈ dme(t1 ), pi ∈ PI :
∀tx ∈ ti(t2 , pi), ty ∈ ti(t1 , pi) : es(tx ) ∩
es(ty ) = ∅
3. In the same process instance, rolebound tasks must have the same
executing-role: ∀t2 ∈ rb(t1 ), pi ∈ PI :
∀tx ∈ ti(t2 , pi), ty ∈ ti(t1 , pi) : er(tx ) =
er(ty )
4. In the same process instance, subjectbound tasks must have the same
executing-subject: ∀t2 ∈ sb(t1 ), pi ∈
PI : ∀tx ∈ ti(t2 , pi), ty ∈ ti(t1 , pi) :
es(tx ) = es(ty )
Figure 2 shows a conceptual model (visualized as a class diagram) that includes
the essential relations of process-related
RBAC delegation models. However, while
a graphical metamodel is a good means
to visualize the connection of different
artifacts, it cannot express all formal relations and invariants of these artifacts.
Therefore, Definition 4 formally specifies
the essential elements of a metamodel for
process-related RBAC delegation models
and the basic interrelations between these
elements. In particular, we combine wellknown concepts of several existing delegation models (see, e.g., Crampton and
Khambhammettu 2008a; Hasebe et al.
2010; Schaad and Moffett 2002; Zhang
et al. 2003b) and integrate them into
a metamodel for process-related RBAC
models.
Definition 4 (Process-Related RBAC
Delegation Model) Let PRDM =
4|2014

(E, Q, D, DL) be a Process-Related Delegation Model, where E refers to the
pairwise disjoint sets of the metamodel,
Q to mappings that establish relationships, D to binding and mutual-exclusion
constraints, and DL to mappings for
delegation policies.
The additional sets of the ProcessRelated RBAC Delegation Model are:
• An element of RR is called Regular
Role. RR ⊆ R.
• An element of DR is called Delegation
Role. DR ⊆ R
• An element of DRT is called Temporary
Delegation Role. DRT ⊆ DR.
• An element of DT T is called Delegable
Task Type. DT T ⊆ TT .
• An element of DU T is called Duty
Type.
• An element of DU I is called Duty
Instance.
• An element of DDU T is called Delegable Duty Type. DDU T ⊆ DU T .
For the mappings of the Process-Related
RBAC Model (Q, D) see Definition 1. Below, we define the additional mappings
for delegation: DL = rrh ∪ drh ∪ creator ∪
drpi ∪ trra ∪ trdel ∪ dta ∪ rrsa ∪ drsa ∪
dui ∪ res ∪ rer (P refers to the power set):
1. Roles R are partitioned into regular roles (RR) and delegation roles
(DR). In RBAC, roles can be arranged in a role-hierarchy, where
senior-roles inherit the permissions
from their junior-roles. For example, in a bank, the senior-role “Bank
manager” inherits all permissions
from its junior-role “Bank clerk”.
Moreover, if “Bank clerk” itself has
junior-roles, “Bank manager” transitively inherits all permissions from
its transitive junior-roles. To avoid
invalid permission inheritance, the
regular role-hierarchy only consists
of regular roles. This mapping replaces the role-hierarchy mapping rh
in Definition 1.def:pcm-rh:
The mapping rrh : RR → P (RR)
is called regular role-hierarchy. For
rrh(rs ) = RRj , we call rs ∈ RR senior regular role and RRj ⊆ RR the
set of direct junior regular roles. The
transitive closure rrh∗ defines the inheritance in the role-hierarchy such
that rrh∗ (rs ) = RRj∗ includes all direct and transitive junior-roles that
the senior-role rs inherits from. The
regular role-hierarchy is cycle-free,
i.e. for each r ∈ RR : rrh∗ (r) ∩ r = ∅.
219
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2. Delegation roles can be arranged in
a delegation role-hierarchy. Note that
each delegation role may have junior
regular roles or junior delegation
roles (see, e.g., Zhang et al. 2003b).
However, delegation roles must not
have senior regular roles to avoid invalid permission inheritance in the
regular role hierarchy:
The mapping drh : DR → P (R) is
called delegation role-hierarchy. For
drh(drs ) = Rj , we call drs ∈ DR senior delegation role and Rj ⊆ R the
set of direct junior-roles. The transitive closure drh∗ defines the inheritance in the role-hierarchy such
that drh∗ (drs ) = Rj∗ includes all direct and transitive junior-roles that
the senior-role drs inherits from. The
delegation role-hierarchy is cyclefree, i.e. for each r ∈ R: drh∗ (r) ∩
r = ∅.
3. Each subject can create an arbitrary
number of delegation roles. Subsequently, the creator will act as the
delegator of its delegation roles. For
example, if subject “Alice” creates a
delegation role “SummerIntern”, she
can delegate parts (or all) of her assigned tasks and duties to “SummerIntern”:
The mapping creator(dr) : DR →
S is called delegation role creator.
For creator(dr) = s, we call dr ∈ DR
delegation role and s ∈ S the creator of
this delegation role.
4. Each delegation role can be specified
either for permanent or for temporary delegation. By default, a delegation role is permanent and is valid for
all process types. In case of temporary delegation, a temporary delegation role has to be specified which is
valid only for particular process instances. For example, the subject “Alice” wants to go on holidays and still
has unfinished credit applications.
Thus, she creates a delegation role
“SummerIntern” that is only valid
for the unfinished applications:
The mapping drpi : DRT →
P (PI ) is called temporary delegation
role mapping. For drpi(drt) = Pdrt ,
we call drt ∈ DRT temporary delegation role for Pdrt ⊆ PI the set of process
instances.
5. Task types are assigned to regular
roles to define the permissions of the
corresponding role. This mapping
replaces the task-to-role assignment
mapping tra in Definition 1.5:
220

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

The mapping trra : RR → P (TT )
is called task-to-regular role assignment. For trra(r) = Tr , we call r ∈
RR regular role and Tr ⊆ TT is called
the set of tasks assigned to r. The
mapping trra−1 : TT → P (RR) returns the set of regular roles a particular task is assigned to. Further,
trra implies a mapping task ownership (town) which allows to determine all tasks that are assigned to a
particular role (see Definition 1.5).
Task types can be defined as being
delegable. Only delegable tasks can
be assigned to delegation roles. Thus,
a subject can delegate a task by assigning this task to a delegation role:
The mapping trdel : DR →
P (DT T ) is called task-to-role delegation. For trdel(dr) = DT dr , we call
dr ∈ DR delegation role and DT dr ⊆
DT T is called the set of delegated
tasks assigned to dr. The mapping
trdel−1 : DT T → P (DR) returns the
set of delegation roles a particular
delegable task is assigned to.
A duty defines an action that must
be performed by a certain subject
in order to comply with legal or
organizational regulations. In a business process context, each duty is
associated with a task (Schefer and
Strembeck 2011a):
The mapping dta : TT →
P (DU T ) is called duty-to-task assignment. For dta(t) = DU x , we call
t ∈ TT task type and DU x ⊆ DU T is
called the set of duties assigned to this
task type.
Delegable tasks can only be delegated, if all associated duties are also
delegable: ∀tx ∈ trdel(dr) : ∀du ∈
dta(tx ) : du ∈ DDU T .
Regular roles are assigned to subjects. Thereby, subjects acquire the
rights to execute the corresponding
tasks and duties. This mapping replaces the role-to-subject assignment
mapping rsa in Definition 1.2:
The mapping rrsa : S → P (RR)
is called regular role-to-subject assignment. For rrsa(s) = RRs , we call
s ∈ S subject and RRs ∈ RR the set of
regular roles owned by s. The mapping rrsa−1 : RR → P (S) returns all
subjects assigned to a regular role.
Further, rrsa implies a mapping roleownership rown, which allows to
determine all roles that are assigned
to a particular subject.
Delegation roles are assigned to delegatees who are subsequently authorized and responsible to perform the

corresponding delegated tasks and
duties:
The mapping drsa : S → P (DR)
is called delegation role-to-subject
assignment. For drsa(s) = DRs , we
call s ∈ S delegatee and DRs ∈ DR
the set of delegation roles owned by s.
The mapping drsa−1 : DR → P (S)
returns all delegatees assigned to a
delegation role.
11. For each task type, we can create an
arbitrary number of respective task
instances via the task instantiation
mapping ti (see Definition 1.6). Similarly, each duty type is instantiated
by a number of duty instances:
The mapping dui : (DU T ×
PI ) → P (DU I ) is called duty instantiation. For dui(duT , pI ) = DU i , we
call DU i ⊆ DU I set of duty instances,
duT ∈ DU T is called duty type and
pI ∈ PI is called process instance.
12. The executing-subject mapping es
returns the subject executing a particular task instance (see Definition 1.3). The subject responsible for discharging a duty is called
the responsible subject of this duty
instance:
The mapping res : DU I → S is
called responsible-subject mapping.
For res(du) = s, we call s ∈ S the responsible subject and du ∈ DU I is
called discharged duty instance.
13. Within the same process instance,
a subject executing a task is also
responsible for discharging all
associated duties:
∀du ∈ dta(t1 ), pi ∈ PI :
∀tx ∈ ti(t1 , pi ), dux ∈ dui(du, pi ):
es(tx ) = res(dux )
14. The role used to actually execute a
certain task instance is called the
executing-role er of this instance (see
Definition 1.4). The role being responsible for actually discharging a
certain duty instance is called the
responsible-role of this instance:
The mapping rer : DU I → R is
called responsible-role mapping. For
rer(du) = r we call r ∈ R the responsible role and du ∈ DU I is called
discharged duty instance.

3 Identifying and Resolving
Delegation Conﬂicts
Due to the immanent complexity of
process-related delegation models, sev-
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Fig. 3 General process of identifying conﬂicts and conﬂict resolutions
Table 1 Connection between the formal consistency requirements and the
algorithms
Delegation conflict

Consistency requirement

Creator conflict
Delegable task conflict
Delegable duty conflict
Delegator task ownership (town) conflict
Delegator role ownership (rown) conflict
Task-assignment SME conflict
Role-assignment SME conflict
SB delegation conflict
RB delegation conflict
SB duty delegation conflict
RB duty delegation conflict
Self-delegation conflict
Cyclic delegation conflict
Temporary delegation role conflict

Definition 4.3
Definition 4.6
Definition 4.8
Definitions 4.6 and 4.9
Definitions 4.3 and 4.9
Definitions 1.8, 2.8, and 4.5
Definitions 1.8, 2.9, and 4.5
Definitions 1.8, 2.3, 2.4, 3.2, and 4.5
Definitions 1.8, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, and 4.5
Definitions 1.8, 4.5, 4.7, and 4.14
Definitions 1.8, 4.5, 4.7, and 4.14
Definitions 4.1 and 4.2
Definition 4.2
Definition 4.4

eral types of potential conflicts may occur. In our delegation model, we identified 14 potential conflicts which need to
be checked when delegating roles, tasks,
or duties in order to prevent invalid task
assignments. Figure 3 shows an UML activity diagram that depicts the general
process we applied to identify the different conflicts and conflict resolutions. In
particular, we first identify the operations
that change a (consistent) RBAC model
(such as adding new task-to-role assignment relations or new constraints). Next,
we identify the consistency requirements
that have to be applied when using the
respective change operation. Based on
these consistency requirements we then
identify potential consistency violations
and derive corresponding conflicts. In the
final step, we define resolution strategies
for each of the conflicts. These steps are
repeated for each change operation.
Thus, each of the conflicts we identified directly relates to the consistency
requirements for process-related delegation models (see Sect. 2.2). Most of
these consistency requirements were previously identified by other researchers
(see, e.g., Botha and Eloff 2001; Crampton and Khambhammettu 2008a, 2008b;
Strembeck and Mendling 2011; Zhang
et al. 2003b). Table 1 shows the connection between different delegation conBusiness & Information Systems Engineering

flicts and the corresponding formal consistency requirement(s). A formal description of the resolution strategies is
provided in Online-Appendix A.
Below, each potential delegation conflict and corresponding resolution strategies are discussed in detail. The conflicts can be detected by applying the algorithms presented in Sect. 4 and can
be resolved by applying one of 21 predefined resolution strategies. These resolutions prevent inconsistent delegation
assignments or runtime allocations. For
most of the conflicts, several alternative resolutions are applicable to resolve
the conflict. The decision on which of
the possible resolutions should be applied usually involves human judgment
as it highly depends on the respective
organizational context and on the desired RBAC configuration. In OnlineAppendix A, all conflict resolutions are
defined with respect to the formal definitions of process-related RBAC delegation models (see Sect. 2 and Strembeck
and Mendling 2010, 2011).
3.1 Identifying and Resolving
Delegability Conﬂicts
Creator conflict: A creator conflict exists
if a subject tries to delegate to a delegation role which he/she has not created.
4|2014

Only the creator of a delegation role can
delegate to it and assign delegatees (see
Definition 4.3). For example, in Fig. 4a
subject s1 tries to delegate task tx to delegation role dry . tx is delegable which is
visualized in Fig. 4a by an arrow attached
to the task-symbol including the letter D.
However, s1 is not the creator of dry .
Resolutions to creator conflicts: To resolve this conflict, we can delegate the
task to one of the delegator’s delegation roles (see Resolution 1 in OnlineAppendix A). As an alternative, the conflict can be resolved by first removing the
respective delegation role. Then the delegator can create a new delegation role
with the same name and is now able to
delegate to it (see Resolution 2 in OnlineAppendix A). In Fig. 4a, s1 can delegate
task tx to one of its delegation roles drz
(see Fig. 4a and Resolution 1). Alternatively, dry is removed. Subsequently, s1
can create a new delegation role named
dry and delegates task tx to dry .
Delegable task conflict: A delegable
task conflict arises if a subject tries to delegate a task which is not defined as delegable. In Fig. 4b, task tx cannot be delegated to delegation role dry , because tx is
not delegable. Similarly, this conflict can
occur if a delegator tries to delegate a role
and one of the tasks assigned to this role
is not delegable.
Resolutions to delegable task conflict:
This conflict can only be resolved by
defining the task(s) that should be delegated as delegable (see Fig. 4b and
Resolution 3).
Delegable duty conflict: A delegable
duty conflict exists if a subject tries to
delegate a task which is associated with
a non-delegable duty. Duties always need
to be discharged by the subject executing the corresponding task. Thus, if a task
is delegated, the corresponding duty also
needs to be delegable. This conflict can
also occur if a delegator tries to delegate
a role and one of the tasks assigned to
this role is associated to a non-delegable
duty. In Fig. 4c, task tx can not be delegated to delegation role dry , because the
duty dux associated to tx is not defined as
delegable.
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Fig. 4 Resolving creator (a),
delegable task (b), and
delegable duty (c) conﬂicts

Fig. 5 Resolving delegator
town (a) and delegator
rown (b) conﬂicts

Resolutions to delegable duty conflict:
This conflict can be resolved by defining the relevant duties as delegable (see
Resolution 4). Alternatively, the conflicting duties could be removed to resolve
the conflict (see Resolution 5). However,
this resolution will rarely be applicable in
real-world scenarios and is thus only presented for the sake of completeness. In
Fig. 4c, tx can be delegated if the associated duty dux is defined as delegable or if
dux is deleted.
3.2 Identifying and Resolving
Ownership Conﬂicts
Delegator task ownership (town) conflict: A delegator town conflict occurs if
a subject tries to delegate a task which
he/she is not assigned to via its regular
role-ownership assignments. A subject
can only delegate tasks and roles which
he/she owns directly or transitively. In
Fig. 5a, subject s1 tries to delegate task
tx to its delegation role dry . However,
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none of the regular roles owned by s1 is
assigned to tx .
Resolutions to delegator town conflicts: The conflict can be resolved by assigning the task to one of the regular
roles owned by the delegator (see Resolution 6). Alternatively, the delegator can
be assigned to one of the regular roles
owning the corresponding task (see Resolution 7). In Fig. 5a, s1 can delegate tx
after assigning tx to the regular role rr1
which is owned by s1 . Alternatively, regular role rr2 owning tx can be assigned to
the delegator s1 .
Delegator role ownership (rown) conflict: A delegator rown conflict occurs if
a subject tries to delegate a role which
he/she is not assigned to. In Fig. 5b, subject s1 tries to delegate the regular role rrj
to its delegation role dry by assigning rrj
as junior-role of dry . However, s1 is not
assigned to rrj .
Resolutions to delegator rown conflicts: The conflict can be resolved by assigning the delegator (directly or transi-

tively) to the role he/she tries to delegate. In Fig. 5b, s1 is assigned to rrj in
order to be able to delegate it to dry (see
Resolution 8).
3.3 Identifying and Resolving SME
Conﬂicts
Task-assignment SME conflict: A taskassignment SME conflict may occur if a
new task-to-role or role-to-role delegation would result in the assignment of
two SME tasks to the same role. Figure 6a depicts an example where a delegation role dry owns a task ty which is
defined as SME to another task tx . Thus,
delegating tx to dry would result in a
task-assignment conflict.
Resolutions to task-assignment SME
conflicts: To avoid the task-assignment
SME conflict in Fig. 6a, the conflicting
SME constraint between the two task
types can be removed or changed into
a DME constraint (see Resolutions 9
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Fig. 6 Resolving task- (a) and role-assignment (b) SME conﬂicts

Fig. 7 Resolving SB/RB (a) and SB/RB duty (b) delegation conﬂicts
and 10). Alternatively, task ty can be revoked from dry , or the conflicting task
ty can be deleted (see Resolutions 11
and 12). Note that some of these resolutions, such as removing a constraint or
a task, will rarely be applicable in realworld scenarios and are thus primarily
presented for the sake of completeness.
Role-assignment SME conflict: A roleassignment SME conflict arises if a taskto-role or role-to-role delegation would
result in the assignment of two SME tasks
to the same subject. As a consequence,
the delegatee would be authorized to perform two SME tasks. Figure 6b shows an
example, where the delegation of task tx
to the delegation role dry would result in
a role-assignment conflict because delegatee s1 would then be authorized to perform the two SME tasks tz and tx . Similarly, when delegating a role to a delegation role or when assigning a delegatee
to a delegation role, we need to check for
role-assignment conflicts.
Resolutions to role-assignment SME
conflicts: To avoid a role-assignment
Business & Information Systems Engineering

SME conflict, the same resolutions as for
task-assignment conflicts can be applied
(see Resolutions 9–12). In addition, Resolution 13 can be applied by revoking
the conflicting assignment between regular role rrz and subject s1 (see Fig. 6b).
Moreover, the conflict can (theoretically)
be resolved by removing the conflicting
subject s1 which is assigned to the two
SME tasks (see Resolution 14).
3.4 Identifying and Resolving Binding
Conﬂicts
SB delegation conflict: A SB delegation
conflict exists if a subject tries to delegate
a task which has a subject-binding to one
or more non-delegable task(s). However,
subject-bound tasks always have to be
performed by the same subject. Thus,
if a task is delegated, all subject-bound
tasks also need to be assigned to the same
delegation role. Otherwise, the SB constraint cannot be fulfilled. In Fig. 7a,
a SB constraint is defined on tx and ty .
Therefore, the subject performing tx also
4|2014

has to perform ty . When delegating tx to
dry a SB conflict arises, because ty is not
defined as delegable. However, to fulfill
the SB constraint, both tasks need to be
delegated to dry .
Resolutions to SB delegation conflicts: This conflict can be resolved by
defining all subject-bound tasks as delegable (see Resolution 3). Alternatively,
the conflicting task or the SB constraint
can be removed (see Resolutions 12
and 15). In Fig. 7a, tx can be delegated,
if ty is defined as delegable. Subsequently,
both tasks can be delegated to dry . The
delegation is also possible, if ty or the SB
constraint on tx and ty is removed.
RB delegation conflict: A RB delegation conflict exists if a subject tries to delegate a task which has a role-binding to
one or more non-delegable task(s). However, role-bound tasks always have to be
performed by members of the same role.
Thus, if a task is delegated, all role-bound
tasks also need to be assigned to the same
delegation role. Otherwise, the RB constraint cannot be fulfilled. In Fig. 7a, a RB
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constraint is defined on tx and ty . Therefore, tx and ty always have to be assigned
to the same role. When delegating tx to
dry a RB conflict arises, because ty is not
defined as delegable. However, to fulfill
the RB constraint, both tasks need to be
delegated to dry .
Resolutions to RB delegation conflicts: This conflict can be resolved by
defining all role-bound tasks as delegable
(see Resolution 3). Alternatively, the conflicting task or the RB constraint can be
removed (see Resolutions 12 and 16). In
Fig. 7a, tx can be delegated, if ty is defined
as delegable. Subsequently, both tasks can
be delegated to dry . The delegation is also
possible, if ty or the RB constraint on tx
and ty is removed.
SB duty delegation conflict: In case a
subject tries to delegate a task which has a
subject-binding to other tasks, a SB duty
delegation conflict arises, if one of the
subject-bound tasks is associated with a
non-delegable duty. In this case, the corresponding subject-bound task cannot be
delegated. However, to fulfill the SB constraint, all subject-bound tasks need to be
delegated. In Fig. 7b, a SB constraint is
defined on tx and ty . Moreover, ty is associated with a duty duy . If subject s1 tries
to delegate tx to dry , it also has to delegate all subject-bound tasks and associated duties. In this example, duy is not
delegable. Thus, a SB duty conflict arises.
Resolutions to SB duty delegation
conflicts: The conflict can be resolved
by defining the respective duty duy as
delegable (see Resolution 4). Alternatively, the conflicting duty duy can be
deleted, the subject-bound task ty being
associated with duy can be deleted, or
the SB constraint can be removed (see
Resolutions 5, 12, and 15).
RB duty delegation conflict: In case a
subject tries to delegate a task which has
a role-binding to other tasks, a RB duty
conflict arises, if one of the role-bound
tasks is associated with a non-delegable
duty. In this case, the corresponding
role-bound task cannot be delegated.
However, to fulfill the RB constraint, all
role-bound tasks need to be delegated
to the same delegation role. If subject s1
tries to delegate tx to dry in Fig. 7b, it also
has to delegate all role-bound tasks and
associated duties to dry . In this example,
duy is not delegable. Thus, a RB duty
conflict arises.
Resolutions to RB duty delegation
conflicts: The conflict can be resolved
by defining the respective duty duy as
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Fig. 8 Resolving self-delegation (a) and cyclic delegation (b) conﬂicts

Fig. 9 Resolving runtime conﬂicts
delegable (see Resolution 4). Alternatively, the conflicting duty duy can be
deleted, the role-bound task ty being
associated with duy can be deleted, or
the RB constraint can be removed (see
Resolutions 5, 12, and 16).
3.5 Identifying and Resolving
Inheritance Conﬂicts
Self-delegation conflict:
A
selfdelegation conflict may arise when delegating a role to itself. In general, a
role cannot be its own junior-role (see
Fig. 8a and Strembeck and Mendling
2010, 2011).
Resolution to self-delegation conflicts: This conflict can be resolved by
selecting another junior- or senior-role
so that the inheritance relation is defined
between two different roles (see Fig. 8a
and Resolution 17).
Cyclic delegation conflict: A cyclic delegation conflict results from delegating
a role to a delegation role which is already defined as senior-role of this delegation role. In particular, a role-hierarchy
must not include a cycle because all roles
within such a cyclic inheritance relation would own the same permissions
which would again render the respective part of the role-hierarchy redundant
(see Fig. 8b and Strembeck and Mendling
2010, 2011).
Resolutions to cyclic delegation conflicts: This conflict can be resolved by

delegating another role to this delegation role which is not already part of the
same role-hierarchy (see Resolution 17).
In Fig. 8b, Resolution 17 is applied by
defining a new inheritance relation between drx and dry while keeping the existing inheritance relation between dry
and drz . Moreover, the existing inheritance relation between dry and drz can be
removed before defining the inverse inheritance relation with drz as junior-role
of dry (see Resolution 18).
3.6 Identifying and Resolving Runtime
Conﬂicts
In addition to the runtime conflicts presented in Schefer et al. (2011) and Strembeck and Mendling (2010), one additional conflict in the context of temporary delegation roles may occur.
Temporary delegation role conflict: A
temporary delegation role conflict occurs
if the selected subject is not allowed to execute a certain task instance because the
temporary delegation role is not valid for
the corresponding process instance. Each
temporary delegation role is only valid
for particular process instances. Thus, a
delegatee assigned to a temporary delegation role is authorized to execute all delegated tasks only within these process instances. In Fig. 9, subject s1 is assigned
to the temporary delegation role drt, and
drt is only valid for the process instance
123. However, the actual process instance
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Algorithm 1 Check if it is allowed to delegate a particular task type to a particular delegation role
Name:

isT2RDelegationAllowed
taskx ∈ TT , droley ∈ DR, delegator ∈ S
1: if delegator = creator(droley ) then return creatorConflict
2: if taskx ∈
/ DT T then return delegableTaskConflict
3: if ∃ duty ∈ dta(taskx ) | duty ∈
x
x / DDU T then return delegableDutyConflict
4: if  r ∈ rown(delegator) | taskx ∈ town(rr) ∧ r ∈ RR then return delegatorTownConflict
5: if ∃ tasky ∈ town(droley ) | tasky ∈ sme(taskx ) then return taskAssignmentSMEConflict
6: if ∃ rolez ∈ allSeniorRoles(droley ) | taskz ∈ town(rolez ) ∧
7:
taskz ∈ sme(taskx ) then return taskAssignmentSMEConflict
8: if ∃ s ∈ S | droley ∈ rown(s) ∧ rolez ∈ rown(s) ∧
9:
taskz ∈ town(rolez ) ∧ taskz ∈ sme(taskx ) then return roleAssignmentSMEConflict
10: if ∃ tasky ∈ sb(taskx ) | tasky ∈
/ DT T then return SBDelegationConflict
11: if ∃ tasky ∈ rb(taskx ) | tasky ∈
/ DT T then return RBDelegationConflict
12: if ∃ tasky ∈ sb(taskx ) | duty ∈ dta(tasky ) ∧
y
13:
dutyy ∈
/ DDU T then return SBDutyDelegationConflict
14: if ∃ tasky ∈ rb(taskx ) | duty ∈ dta(tasky ) ∧
y
15:
dutyy ∈
/ DDU T then return RBDutyDelegationConflict

Input:

16:

return

true

Algorithm 2 Check if it is allowed to delegate a particular role to a delegation role
Name:

isR2RDelegationAllowed
junior ∈ R, senior ∈ DR, delegator ∈ S
1: if delegator = creator(senior) then return creatorConflict
2: if junior ∈
/ rown(delegator) then return delegatorRownConflict
3: if junior == senior then return selfDelegationConflict
4: if ∃ taskx ∈ town(junior) | taskx ∈
/ DT then return delegableTaskConflict
5: if ∃ taskx ∈ town(junior) | duty ∈ dta(taskx ) ∧
x
6:
dutyx ∈
/ DDU T then return delegableDutyConflict
7: if junior ∈ DR then ∃ r ∈ rown(delegator) | taskx ∈ town(junior) ∧
8:
taskx ∈ town(r) ∧ r ∈ RR else return delegatorTownConflict
∗
9: if senior ∈ drh (junior) then return cyclicDelegationConflict
10: if ∃ taskj ∈ town(junior) | tasks ∈ town(senior) ∧
11:
taskj ∈ sme(tasks ) then return taskAssignmentSMEConflict
12: if ∃ rolex ∈ allSeniorRoles(senior) | taskx ∈ town(rolex ) ∧
13:
taskj ∈ town(junior) ∧ taskx ∈ sme(taskj )

Input:

14:
15:
16:
17:

then return

taskAssignmentSMEConflict

∃ s ∈ S | senior ∈ rown(s) ∧ rolex ∈ rown(s) ∧
taskx ∈ town(rolex ) ∧ taskj ∈ town(junior) ∧ taskx ∈ sme(taskj )

if

then return

roleAssignmentSMEConflict

∃ taskx ∈ town(junior) | tasky ∈ sb(taskx ) ∧
19:
tasky ∈
/ DT T then return SBDelegationConflict
20: if ∃ taskx ∈ town(junior) | tasky ∈ sb(taskx ) ∧
21:
∃ dutyy ∈ dta(tasky ) ∧ dutyy ∈
/ DDU T then return SBDutyDelegationConflict
18:

if

22:

return

true

is 456. Thus, s1 is not allowed to execute the delegated tasks in this process
instance.
Resolving temporary delegation role
conflicts: The conflict can be resolved
by adding the corresponding process instance to the process instances a temporary delegation role is valid for (see
Resolution 19). Another solution is to
change a temporary delegation role into
a permanent delegation role (see Resolution 20). Subsequently, delegatees are
authorized to perform all instances of
Business & Information Systems Engineering

the delegated tasks. In Fig. 9 Resolution 19 is applied by defining that delegation role drt now is also valid for
the process instance 456. As an alternative, drt can be changed into a permanent delegation role. Alternatively, one
can allocate an executing subject that actually owns the permission to perform
the respective task (see Resolution 21).
Subject s2 is authorized to perform instances of tx . Thus, we can allocate s2 as
executing subject for this particular task
instance.
4|2014

4 Algorithms for Detecting
Delegation Conﬂicts
In this Section, we provide algorithms to
detect the delegation conflicts introduced
in Sect. 3 in process-related RBAC models at design-time and runtime. To support a systematic conflict handling, we
suggest to perform the following three
steps. First, one needs to detect a conflict
when delegating tasks, duties, or roles or
when assigning a subject to a delegation
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Algorithm 3 Check if it is allowed to assign a particular delegation role to a certain delegatee
Name:

isR2SDelegationAllowed
drolex ∈ DR, delegatee, delegator ∈ S
1: if delegator = creator(drolex ) then return creatorConflict
2: if ∃ roley ∈ rown(delegatee) | tasky ∈ town(roley ) ∧
3:
taskx ∈ town(drolex ) ∧ tasky ∈ sme(taskx ) then return roleAssignmentSMEConflict

Input:

4:

return

true

Algorithm 4 Check if a particular task instance that is executed in a certain process instance can be allocated to a specific delegatee
Name:

isDelegateeAllocationAllowed
drole ∈ DRT, delegatee ∈ S, tasktype ∈ TT , processtype ∈ PT ,
processinstance ∈ pi(processtype ), taskinstance ∈ ti(tasktype , processinstance )
1: if ∃ instancey ∈ ti(type , process
y
instance ) | ar(delegatee) = drole ∧
2:
processinstance ∈
/ drpi(drole) then return temporaryDelegationRoleConflict

Input:

3:

return

true

role. After detecting a conflict, we have to
decide on how to resolve this conflict, i.e.,
decide which resolution strategy to apply.
After applying the resolution strategy, the
requested delegation can be performed.
Algorithms 1–3 check the designtime consistency of a process-related
RBAC delegation model before defining a new task-to-role, role-to-role, or
role-to-subject delegation relation. Algorithm 4 checks the runtime consistency
of a process-related RBAC delegation
model. In particular, it checks, if a temporary delegation role authorizes a subject to perform a delegated task in a certain process instance. These algorithms
complement the set of algorithms presented in Schefer et al. (2011) and Strembeck and Mendling (2010) which detect potential conflicts of process-related
RBAC models not related to delegation. If
a delegation conflict is detected, the algorithms presented below return the name
of the respective conflict.

5 A UML Extension for Modeling
Process-Related Delegation
Models
An organization’s business processes
and software systems are often modeled via graphical modeling languages.
The Unified Modeling Language (UML;
OMG 2011b) offers a comprehensive
and well-defined modeling framework
and is the de facto standard for modeling and specifying information systems.
The UML’s main intention is to capture modeling artifacts throughout the
whole development lifecycle with the
same modeling language OMG (2011b).
The UML metamodel builds upon the
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OMG Meta Object Facility (MOF OMG
2011a) and defines the abstract syntax of
all UML diagram types. Modeling support for the delegation of roles, tasks,
and duties via a standard notation can
help to bridge the communication gap
between software engineers, security
experts, experts of the application domain, and other stakeholders (see, e.g.,
Mouratidis and Jürjens 2010). Several
approaches already exist that consider
different kinds of security properties in a
UML context (see, e.g., Basin et al. 2006;
Jürjens 2005; Rodriguez et al. 2006;
Rodriguez and de Guzman 2007).
UML2 activity models offer a process
modeling language that allows to model
the control flows and object flows between different actions. The main element of an activity diagram is an activity. Its behavior is defined by a decomposition into different actions. A UML2
activity thus models a process while the
actions that are included in the activity can be used to model tasks (for details on UML2 activity models, see OMG
2011b). However, sometimes UML diagrams can not provide all relevant aspects of a specification. Therefore, there
is a need to define additional constraints
about the modeling elements. The Object Constraint Language (OCL) provides
a formal language that enables the definition of constraints on UML models
(OMG 2014). We apply the OCL to define additional delegation-specific constraints for our UML extension. In particular, the OCL invariants defined in
Sect. 5.2 ensure the consistency and correctness of UML models using our new
modeling elements.
The UML standard basically provides
two options to adapt its metamodel to

a specific area of application (OMG
2011b): (a) defining a UML profile specification using stereotypes, tag definitions,
and constraints. A UML profile must
not change the UML metamodel but can
only extend existing UML meta-classes
for special domains. Thus, UML profiles
are not a first-class extension mechanism
(see OMG 2011b, p. 660); (b) extending the UML metamodel, which allows
for the definition of new elements with
customized semantics.
In this paper, we apply the second option (extending the UML metamodel)
because the newly defined modeling elements for process-related delegation require new semantics which are not available in the UML metamodel. Thus,
we introduce the BusinessActivityDelegations extension for the UML metamodel which is designed for modeling
the delegation of roles, tasks, and duties based on the formal metamodel definitions presented in Sect. 2. For this
purpose, we extend the BusinessActivities package (Strembeck and Mendling
2011), which provides UML modeling
support for process-related RBAC models. We also implemented the extended
metamodel as a delegation extension to
the BusinessActivity library and runtime
engine (see Sect. 7).
5.1 UML Metamodel Overview
Based on the formal CIM-layer metamodel for process-related RBAC delegation models presented in Sect. 2, Fig. 10
presents our corresponding extension to
the UML at the PIM layer. In our UML
extension, a BusinessActivity is a special
UML Activity (see Fig. 10). In addition
to our newly introduced elements, it can
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Fig. 10 UML metamodel extension BusinessActivityDelegations for Activity diagrams

Fig. 11 Visualizing (a) delegation roles
and (b) delegator relations
include all elements available for ordinary UML Activities. A BusinessAction
corresponds to a task in a business processes and comprises all permissions to
perform the respective task (see Strembeck and Mendling 2011 for further details on BusinessActivities and BusinessActions). A Duty is a special UML Classifier (see Fig. 10) and is used to model that
an action must be performed by a certain
Subject (Schefer and Strembeck 2011a).
The link between Duties and BusinessActions assures that a Subject being assigned to a Duty also receives all permissions to perform these Duties. Roles and
Subjects are specialized UML Classifiers
Strembeck and Mendling (2011) which
are linked to BusinessActions and Duties
(see Fig. 10). Furthermore, a Duty may
be linked to a DutyTimeConstraint which
is a specialized UML TimeConstraint.
If a DutyTimeConstraint has expired, a
Business & Information Systems Engineering

Compensation Action is triggered which is
defined as stereotype of the Action metaclass (see Schefer and Strembeck 2011a
for further details).
A DelegationRole is a special type of
Role which is assigned to a set of delegated Roles, BusinessActions, and/or Duties (see Fig. 10). A DelegatorRelation is
a special UML DirectedRelationship and
indicates that a certain Subject acts as
a delegator for a certain DelegationRole.
Only delegators may delegate Roles, BusinessActions, or Duties to DelegationRoles (see OCL Constraint 1 in Sect. 5.2).
Figure 11 illustrates presentation options
to visualize delegation roles and delegator relations. Note that these relations
are formally defined through our UML
metamodel extension and therefore exist independent of their actual graphical
representation.
DelegationRoles are assigned to delegatees which thereby are authorized to perform the respective BusinessActions and
Duties (see OCL Constraint 2). A delegator can delegate a Role by defining this
Role as junior-role to one of his or her
DelegationRoles. All BusinessActions and
Duties assigned to this Role need to be
delegable (see below). Note that DelegationRoles must not have senior regular
4|2014

Roles to avoid invalid permission inheritance (see OCL Constraint 3). For delegating a BusinessAction, the delegator assigns the BusinessAction to the respective DelegationRole. Only if a BusinessAction is delegable, it can be delegated to
a DelegationRole (see OCL Constraints 4
and 6). To realize delegation of Duties in
UML models, a Duty also needs to be defined as being delegable (see OCL Constraints 5, 7, and 9). After assigning a delegatee, the delegator loses his obligation
to perform this Duty. Yet, a review duty
can be defined (Schaad and Moffett 2002)
which obliges the delegator to control
the proper enforcement of his delegated
Duties (see OCL Constraints 8 and 9).
To consider the aspect of permanence
in delegation (Barka and Sandhu 2000b),
our DelegationRoles can either be defined for temporary or for permanent
delegation, i.e., for a single or for all instances of a business process (see OCL
Constraints 10 and 11). Furthermore, we
support single- and multi-step delegation
for BusinessActions and Duties. Singlestep delegation means that a delegated
BusinessAction or Duty can not be further delegated by the delegatee (Barka
and Sandhu 2000b). This is achieved
by defining an attribute called isDelegated for each BusinessAction and for
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OCL Constraint 1 The delegator of a Duty, a BusinessAction, or a Role needs to be the Subject who is directly assigned to the
respective delegation unit.
context Subject
inv: self.delegatorRelation->forAll(d |
d.delegationRole.delegatedDuty->forAll(dd |
dd.role->exists(r |
r.roleToSubjectAssignment->exists(rsa |
rsa.subject = self ))))
inv: self.delegatorRelation->forAll(d |
d.delegationRole.businessaction->forAll(ba |
ba.role->exists(r |
r.roleToSubjectAssignment->exists(rsa |
rsa.subject = self ))
or
ba.transitiveTaskOwner->exists(to |
to.roleToSubjectAssignment->exists(torsa |
torsa.subject = self ))))
inv: self.delegatorRelation->forAll(d |
d.delegationRole.seniorAssignment->notEmpty() implies
d.delegationRole.seniorAssignment->forAll(sa |
if sa.juniorRole.oclIsTypeOf(Role) then
sa.juniorRole.roleToSubjectAssignment->exists(rsa | rsa.subject = self)
or
sa.juniorRole.transitiveRoleOwner->exists(tro | tro = self )
else true endif ))

OCL Constraint 6 Each BusinessAction defines an attribute called “isDelegated” stating if a special BusinessAction has already
been delegated or not. If it has already been delegated, it cannot be delegated further (single-step delegation, see Barka and Sandhu
2000b).
context BusinessAction
inv: self.instanceSpecification->forAll(i | i.slot->exists(s | s.definingFeature.name = isDelegated))
inv: self.instanceSpecification->forAll(i |
let baid : Slot = i.slot->select(s | s.definingFeature.name = isDelegated) in
let bdgb : Slot = i.slot->select(d | d.definingFeature.name = delegable) in
if baid.value = true then bdgb.value = false
else true endif )

OCL Constraint 11 If a DelegationRole is intended for temporary delegation only (isTemporary=true), it defines an attribute called
“relatedProcessInstance” to ensure that the respective DelegationRole can only be used in the defined process instance.
context DelegationRole
inv: self.instanceSpecification->forAll(i | i.slot->exists(s | s.definingFeature.name = relatedProcessInstance ))
inv: self.instanceSpecification->forAll(i |
self.businessAction->exists(ba |
ba.activity.instanceSpecification->exists(a |
let drit : Slot = i.slot->select(si | si.definingFeature.name = isTemporary) in
if drit.value = true then
let rpi : Slot = i.slot->select(so | so.definingFeature.name = relatedProcessInstance) in
let apid : Slot = a.slot->select(sa | sa.definingFeature.name = processID) in
rpi.value = apid.value
else true endif )))

each Duty. The isDelegated attribute is
set to true as soon as the respective
BusinessAction or Duty has been delegated. If a BusinessAction’s or a Duty’s
isDelegated-attribute is set to true, its delegable-attribute is set to false (see OCL
Constraints 6 and 7). One advantage of
single-step delegation is that the delegator who might be obliged to supervise the enforcement keeps control about
who is responsible for actually performing the delegated BusinessAction or discharging the delegated Duty. However,
multi-step delegation can easily be ac228

tivated by using OCL Constraints 15
and 16 instead.
5.2 OCL Constraints
Often a structural UML model cannot
capture all types of constraints which
are relevant for describing a target domain. Thus, additional constraints can
be defined, for example, by using a constraint expression language, such as the
OCL (OMG 2014). In this paper, we use
OCL invariants to define the semantics by
encoding delegation-specific constraints.
For the sake of readability, this Section

only shows three example OCL invariants. The complete list of OCL invariants for the Business Activity Delegations extension can be found in OnlineAppendix B. In addition, Table 2 gives an
overview of how each of the definitions
from Sect. 2.2 is mapped to our UML extension for Business Activity Delegation
Models.
5.3 Example for Business Activity
Delegation Models
In Fig. 12, the credit application process
from Fig. 1 is extended by including the
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Table 2 Consistency between generic metamodel and UML extension
Generic Definition

Covered through

Definition 4.1: rrh : RR → P (RR)

Metamodel extension: RoleToRoleAssignment relation (see Fig. 10 and Strembeck and
Mendling 2011)

Definition 4.2: drh : DR → P (R)

Metamodel extension: RoleToRoleAssignment relation (see Fig. 10) and OCL Constraint 3

Definition 4.3: creator(dr) : DR → S

Metamodel extension: DelegatorRelation metaclass (see Fig. 10) and OCL Constraint 1

Definition 4.4: drpi : DRT → P (PI )

OCL Constraints 10 and 11

Definition 4.5: trra : RR → P (TT )

Metamodel extension: Association between Role and BusinessAction (see Fig. 10 and
Strembeck and Mendling 2011)

Definition 4.6: trdel : DR → P (DT T )

Metamodel extension: Association between Role and BusinessAction (see Fig. 10) and OCL
Constraints 4, 6, and 15

Definition 4.7: dta : TT → P (DU T )

Metamodel extension: Association between Duty and BusinessAction (see Fig. 10)

Definition 4.8:
∀tx ∈ trdel(dr) : ∀du ∈ dta(tx ) : du ∈ DDU T

OCL Constraints 5, 7, 8, 9, and 16

Definition 4.9: rrsa : S → P (RR)

Metamodel extension: RoleToSubjectAssignment relation (see Fig. 10 and Strembeck and
Mendling 2011)

Definition 4.10: drsa : S → P (DR)

Metamodel extension: RoleToSubjectAssignment relation (see Fig. 10) and OCL
Constraint 2

Definition 4.11: dui : (DU T × PI ) → P (DU I )

Implicitly defined via our metamodel extension and the specification of UML activity
models (see Fig. 10) and OMG (2011b), Schefer and Strembeck (2011a)

Definition 4.12: res : DU I → S

OCL Constraint 12

Definition 4.13: ∀du ∈ dta(t1 ), pi ∈ PI : ∀tx ∈
ti(t1 , pi ), dux ∈ dui(du, pi ) : es(tx ) = res(dux )

OCL Constraint 13

Definition 4.14: rer : DU I → R

OCL Constraint 14

Fig. 12 Extended credit application process
Business & Information Systems Engineering
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Fig. 13 Multi-method research design
new modeling constructs introduced in
Sect. 5.1. The process in Fig. 12a includes
five actions, three of which are defined
as BusinessActions. The BusinessActions
are associated with Duties: the BusinessAction Check credit worthiness is associated with the Duty Check applicant rating, the BusinessAction Negotiate contract
with the Duty Fulfill precontractual duties,
and the BusinessAction Approve contract
with the Duty Review final contract. In
addition, the Compensation Action Reassign Duty is triggered if the Duty Check
applicant rating is not discharged in time.
Figure 12b presents the Duty Check
applicant rating which is connected to
the BusinessAction Check credit worthiness. It is associated with a DutyTimeConstraint and a Compensation Action.
The DutyTimeConstraint expresses that
the Duty Check applicant rating needs
to be completed within three time units
(e.g., days) after the corresponding BusinessAction has been started. Otherwise,
the Compensation Action Reassign Duty
is executed.
The responsibility for the Duties is illustrated in Fig. 12c showing the Role
BankClerk which is assigned to the three
BusinessActions and the associated Duties defined in the credit application process. Thus, a Subject assigned to the
BankClerk role is responsible for performing these Duties and related BusinessActions. In this example, the Subject
M. Meyer is assigned to the BankClerk
role and therefore also needs to discharge the associated Duties. M. Meyer
decides to delegate her Duty Check applicant rating to her summer intern J. Smith.
For this purpose, she creates a permanent DelegationRole SummerIntern and
assigns the Duty to the DelegationRole.
Subsequently, she assigns the Subject J.
230

Smith to her DelegationRole SummerIntern. J. Smith is now authorized and responsible for discharging the Duty Check
applicant rating when performing the
BusinessAction Check credit worthiness,
until either the Duty is revoked from the
DelegationRole or he loses his assignment to the DelegationRole.

6 Case Study on Modeling
Process-Related RBAC Delegation
Models
To evaluate our approach with regard
to its practical applicability, we conducted a case study applying our UML
extension on real-world processes. Our
case study is based on a collection of realworld process models we retrieved from
a large Austrian school center. The selection consists of about 30 processes, which
were collected by members of the school
during a process management initiative.
The control flow of some processes was
graphically visualized depicting the sequence of tasks and corresponding authorized/responsible persons. However,
these processes were visualized using a
non-standard ad hoc graphical notation.
Furthermore, most of the processes were
described in a detailed textual/tabular
listing of activities with varying level of
granularity. The process descriptions included references to legal requirements
(e.g., certain paragraphs in the Austrian
law concerning teaching in schools) and
other internal or external regulations.
In the case study presented in this paper, we remodeled the processes that included information on delegation scenarios via our UML extension (see Sect. 5).
This case study is part of a larger qualitative multi-method study presented in
Schefer-Wenzl et al. (2013). In particular,

we adopted a sequential multi-method
research design with two subsequent research phases and two different research
instruments (see Fig. 13). The two guiding research questions were: Which are
the barriers to adopting our UML extensions by domain modelers having a basic background in UML activity modeling (RQ1)? Which are the barriers to
using the process models based on our
UML extensions for non-technical, nonsecurity stakeholders in modeled organizations (RQ2)?
As for RQ1, we designed interpretative
case studies because we wanted to address RQ1 using non-trivial process engineering tasks. RQ2 would then be covered by subsequent semi-structured interviews which would allow us to collect data concerning the communicability
as perceived by important stakeholders.
In addition, the interviews would permit
clarifying critical model details for the respondents to improve the quality of the
answers. For further details on the whole
study, please refer to Schefer-Wenzl et al.
(2013).
In Fig. 14, an example process from the
case study on the UML extension presented in this paper is illustrated. The
complete set of processes modeled in
this case study is documented in Vondal
(2012). Figure 14a depicts a BusinessActicity that models the process of organizing the school’s open day. This process
is part of a larger set of processes dealing with the organization of the open day.
All new modeling elements introduced in
the Delegations extension are used in this
example process. The process depicted
in Fig. 14a includes six BusinessActions.
Two of these BusinessActions are associated with duties. Moreover, the process
defines two subject-binding constraints
between “Schedule date” and “Announce
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Fig. 14 Example process in an Austrian school
Table 3 Questions from the semi-structured interviews
Q1

Do the process models provide added value for the school? If yes, in how far can the school/members of the school benefit from the
extended process models?

Q2

How will the extended process models potentially be used in the school?

Q3

What do you think about our approach of integrating process models and related security aspects? Advantages/Disadvantages?

Q4

Do you have difficulties in understanding different parts of the processes? If yes, which parts are easy to understand and which parts are
difficult or not comprehensible?

Q5

Do you have any suggestions on how the graphical representation of the processes can be improved?

date” as well as between “Check timeliness of schedule” and “Adapt schedule”. In Fig. 14b, roles and corresponding task and duty assignments are shown.
We identified three roles for the open day
organization process. For example, the
headmaster of this school is permitted to
perform five of the tasks in this process,
two of these tasks are inherited from a
junior-role.
Figure 14c illustrates which tasks and
duties of the open day organization process a headmaster is allowed to delegate to
his/her substitute headmaster. Note that
these tasks and duties need to be defined
as delegable before we can delegate them
(see Sects. 2 and 5). The headmaster may
delegate two of the tasks to his/her delegation role substitute headmaster. Moreover, when delegating a task being associated to a duty, this duty also has to be delegated (see Sects. 2 and 5). Subsequently,
all delegatees being assigned to the deleBusiness & Information Systems Engineering

gation role substitute headmaster are authorized to perform the delegated tasks
and duties.
After remodeling the processes via our
UML extension, we evaluated the remodeled process diagrams of the case study by
performing semi-structured interviews
with three members of the school, including the headmaster, one teacher, and
one member of the administrative staff.
This approach was chosen because interviews are one of the most important methods in case study research (see,
e.g., Runeson and Höst 2009). Moreover,
for qualitative case studies it is recommended to choose subjects from different
parts of the organization to involve different roles in the interviews (Corbin and
Strauss 2008).
The interview was carefully designed
using the guidelines from Hove and Anda
(2005). It consisted of five main openended questions. Each interview varied
4|2014

between 20 and 25 minutes in length.
The answers were recorded by using field
notes which were then subsequently analyzed by the interviewer. Table 3 details the main questions asked in the
interviews.
In the interviews, two advantages of
the visually modeled processes were communicated: First, the headmaster emphasized that new employees who are not
familiar with school procedures would
now have a comprehensive and easy-tounderstand, diagram-based documentation of key processes and related delegation concerns at hand. This would have
the potential of facilitating work tasks
and communication with other school
members during the first weeks after
joining the school. This opinion may
also support the frequently cited conjecture that models employing a process flow metaphor are suitable communication instruments for non-technical
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domain experts (see, e.g., Dumas et al.
2012). In addition, before the case study
was performed, only a few processes were
depicted using an ad hoc (i.e., nonstandard) visual notation. Most processes
were described via textual documents in
varying degrees of detail. The state of
the organization’s process descriptions
was therefore inconsistent and inhomogeneous. Moreover, the interview partners noted that the access-control enriched process models would improve
the general awareness among the school
members of how closely security requirements are related to key organizational processes. All three members of the
school stated that the process models are
easy to comprehend (e.g., task and role
labels, basic sequencing of tasks, relations
between duties and tasks).
The case study design was aligned to
evaluating our modeling framework. As
a consequence, the study design presents
limitations to the generalizability of our
findings. An important limitation results
from the scope of a single organization. The observations might therefore be
specific to the domain of Austrian secondary schooling. However, within this
domain, we aimed at a broad coverage of domain areas: the process models cover topics ranging from the school’s
process management to the emergency
evacuation procedures. Nevertheless, future work must investigate whether the
findings hold for different branches and
different types of organizations.
In likewise manner, there are threats
to the observations from the three interviews. To begin with, they cannot be generalized beyond the narrow educational
domain because the interview partners
are all embedded into a single institution. There is also the risk of an interviewer bias because the interviewer is
also author of the evaluated UML extensions. This double role might have affected the open-ended conversation of
the interviews. To minimize this risk,
the interviewer, however, tried to observe
rather than steer the conversation and
encouraged the interviewees to talk.

7 Platform Support
In order to provide runtime support for
the enforcement of process-related RBAC
delegation models at the PSM layer, we
implemented a corresponding extension
to the Business Activity library and runtime engine. In this Section, we provide
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Fig. 15 Class model of the Business Activity library and runtime engine (Strembeck
and Mendling 2011)
an overview of our platform support for
process-related RBAC delegation models
(available for download at BAL 2012).
First, we present the Business Activity
library and runtime engine.
The Business Activity library and runtime engine is a software platform that
can manage process-related RBAC runtime models and enforce access control
policies as well as several kinds of entailment constraints (see Strembeck and
Mendling 2011). It supports all artifacts
of process-related RBAC models and
provides functions for managing corresponding runtime instances. Moreover, it
automatically enforces all invariants defined via OCL constraints (see Sect. 5.2).
Figure 15 shows an excerpt of the essential class relations of the Business Activity
library and runtime engine.
The Delegation package extends the
Business Activity library and runtime
engine with support for process-related
RBAC delegation models as defined in
the previous Sections. Figure 16 shows
the essential class relations of the Delegation extension package. The Business
Activity library and runtime engine as
well as the Delegation extension package
are implemented via the programming
language eXtended Object Tcl (XOTcl,
see, e.g., Neumann and Sobernig 2009,
2011; Neumann and Zdun 2000). XOTcl
is an object-oriented extension of the

scripting language Tcl (Ousterhout 1990)
and is publicly available from Neumann
and Zdun (2012). XOTcl is a C-library
that can be dynamically loaded into Tclcompatible environments and is embeddable into C programs. Amongst others, XOTcl provides a mixin mechanism
(see Zdun et al. 2007). XOTcl mixin
classes are a dynamic message interception technique. They allow to flexibly define extension classes in addition to the
inheritance hierarchy.
XOTcl supports per-object mixins as
well as per-class mixins. Per-object mixins are classes that are applied as mixins
for an individual instance of a class, while
per-class mixins are classes that are applied as mixins for a class (see Zdun et al.
2007 for details). Both XOTcl mixin constructs are used in the Delegation extensions package to dynamically activate or
deactivate certain behavior for a class or
object (see Fig. 16).
The Business Activity library and runtime engine in combination with the Delegation extension package ensures the
compliance of processes modeled via
the BusinessActivitiesDelegation extension and user-defined delegation policies. Thereby, it supports a straightforward mapping of modeling level RBAC
delegation models to the corresponding
runtime models.
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Fig. 16 Class model of the
Delegation package

8 Related Work
In general, we distinguish three types of
related work for this paper. First, we have
approaches that primarily aim to integrate delegation aspects into role-based
access control models. Second, a few approaches focus on the delegation of duties/obligations. Third, a number of different delegation approaches for business process/workflow environments exist. Many of the access control- and business process-related approaches are complementary to our work and are wellsuited to be combined with our processrelated RBAC delegation models.
Table 4 shows an overview of related
work on modeling delegation of roles,
tasks, and duties in an access control or
business process context. With respect
to the concepts and artifacts specified in
√
Sects. 2, 3, 4, and 5, we use a if a related
approach provides similar and/or comparable support for a certain concept,
and a  if a related approach provides
at least partial support for a particular
aspect.
In recent years, there has been much
work on various aspects of role- and
permission-based delegation. In Barka
and Sandhu (2000b), RBDM, a framework for characterizing role-based delegation models is presented which distinguishes, for instance, between permanent or temporary, partial or total, and
single- or multi-step delegation. All of
these concepts are also integrated in our
Business & Information Systems Engineering

delegation model presented in this paper. A formal model and some extensions
for RBDM are presented in Barka and
Sandhu (2000a). RDM2000 (Zhang et al.
2003a) is an extension of RBDM supporting role-based and multi-step delegation. Furthermore, a rule-based declarative language is proposed to specify and
enforce policies. Similar to our approach,
separation of duty constraints are considered and corresponding tool support is
provided.
In Zhang et al. (2003b), a permissionbased delegation model (PBDM) is presented which allows for delegation of
roles and permissions. Delegation roles
are defined to delegate permissions to a
user. Most of the concepts introduced in
Zhang et al. (2003b) are also integrated
in our delegation model. Yet, support for
entailment constraints in Zhang et al.
(2003b) is limited to static separation of
duty constraints, while we also consider
binding constraints. An approach similar to Zhang et al. (2003b) is presented in
Hasebe et al. (2010), where a capabilitybased delegation model (CRBAC) based
on RBAC96 (Sandhu et al. 1996) is introduced to support cross-domain delegation of roles and permissions in terms
of capability transfer. Compared to our
work, none of these approaches supports the delegation of duties. Some
delegation-related conflicts are only detected in Zhang et al. (2003b), without
providing corresponding resolutions. Recently, an approach for the model-based
specification of role-based delegation and
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revocation policies via UML was introduced in Sohr et al. (2012). In contrast
to our approach, Sohr et al. (2012) do
not integrate their concepts into a business process context. Moreover, they do
not address the delegation of duties, and
do not consider binding constraints. In
addition, their modeling approach is not
based on a formal metamodel. Instead,
standard UML class and object diagrams
are used for graphically visualizing delegation policies. Corresponding tool support as well as conflict detection and resolution handling is not provided in Sohr
et al. (2012).
Duties or obligations may also be subject to delegation. Yet, the delegation of
duties has received little attention in literature so far, although it has been identified as important phenomenon, e.g.,
in Cole et al. (2001), where different
ways of delegating obligations are discussed. In Schaad and Moffett (2002),
the delegation of obligations is addressed,
mainly motivating the reasons for delegating obligations and stressing the need
for balancing authorizations and obligations. Recently, a basic delegation model
for obligations has been introduced in
Ghorbel-Talbi et al. (2010, 2011). In
this approach, different kinds of dutylevel and role-level delegations are considered, also taking contextual information into account. However, in comparison to our work none of these approaches considers the delegation of duties in a business process context. Moreover, entailment constraints, correspond233
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Table 4 Comparison of related work
Delegation of
roles

Role-based delegation models
Barka and Sandhu (2000a, 2000b)
Zhang et al. (2003a)
Shang and Wang (2008); Zhang
et al. (2003b)
Hasebe et al. (2010)
Sohr et al. (2012)

Delegation of
tasks

Atluri and Warner (2005)
Wainer et al. (2007)
Crampton and Khambhammettu
(2008c)
Crampton and Khambhammettu
(2008a)
Process-related RBAC delegation
models (our approach)

Formal
metamodel
(CIM
layer)

Modeling
support
(PIM
layer)






Tool
support
(PSM
layer)





√



√





√
√
√





√



√

√

√



√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

ing modeling/tool support, or the detection and resolution of related conflicts is
not further analyzed.
Delegation in a business process/workflow context has also received
considerable attention. In Atluri and
Warner (2005), the notion of delegation
is extended to allow for conditional delegation. Different types of constraints,
such as separation of duty constraints,
are addressed in the context of delegation. Moreover, three types of conflicts
as well as a runtime allocation algorithm
comparable to Algorithm 4 presented in
Sect. 4 are presented. A formal model
for role-based and task-based delegation in workflows using the notions of
case and organizational unit is described
in Wainer et al. (2007). Compared to
our work, Wainer et al. (2007) does not
distinguish between subject-based and
role-based binding constraints. Moreover, the detection and resolution of
delegation-related conflicts is not discussed in Wainer et al. (2007). Similar approaches are also presented in Crampton
and Khambhammettu (2008a, 2008c)
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Conflict
resolution



√

Delegation in business processes
Gaaloul and Charoy (2009);
Gaaloul et al. (2011, 2010)

Conflict
detection



√

Cole et al. (2001)
Ghorbel-Talbi et al. (2010, 2011)

Entailment
constraints

√

Delegation models for obligations
Schaad and Moffett (2002)

Delegation of
duties

√

√
















√

√

without providing related modeling support and only limited support for conflict
detection. The effects of some delegation
operations on three workflow execution
models are described in Crampton and
Khambhammettu (2008c).
Only few contributions exist which
consider authorization constraints and
related conflicts in the context of delegation. Gaaloul and Charoy (2009) and
Gaaloul et al. (2011, 2010) present a formal approach for integrating task delegation into the RBAC model which also
considers separation of duty and binding
of duty constraints. Compared to Gaaloul
and Charoy (2009) and Gaaloul et al.
(2011, 2010), our approach also considers the delegation of duties and provides
a corresponding extension to the UML
to enable the graphical visualization of
process-related delegation concepts. In
Shang and Wang (2008), an extension
to PBDM is presented to integrate authorization constraints in permissionbased delegation. In contrast to our work,
Shang and Wang (2008) only focuses on
static separation of duty constraints and






√

√

√

√

shortly addresses related conflicts. Moreover, only role-based constraints are analyzed, while we consider task-based constraints. In Crampton and Khambhammettu (2008a), the satisfiability problem of workflows in the context of constrained delegation is addressed. Crampton also provides an algorithm that determines whether to permit a delegation
request. However, the algorithm does
not distinguish between different conflict
types and does not provide corresponding resolutions in order to permit the
delegation. Furthermore, this approach
only considers task- and role-based delegation, while we also allow for the delegation of duties. Schaad addresses delegation conflicts in Schaad (2001). In contrast to our work, only conflicts between
separation of duty constraints and delegation activities in the RBAC96 model are
considered. Moreover, the conflicts are
detected after conducting the delegation,
while our algorithms detect conflicts before the delegation is performed. Thus, in
our approach, conflicts are detected and
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resolved before causing an inconsistent
RBAC configuration.
To the best of our knowledge, this work
represents the first attempt to systematically check for conflicts before delegating tasks, duties, and roles in a business
process context at design- and runtime.
In contrast to other approaches, we also
consider mutual-exclusion and binding
constraints and provide resolution strategies to resolve each conflict type (see
Table 4).

9 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an approach
to support the integrated modeling of
delegation concepts and business processes. Our approach is based on a formal CIM-layer metamodel for processrelated RBAC delegation models. Moreover, we presented generic algorithms
and resolution strategies for conflicts detected in the context of the delegation of
tasks, duties, and roles. A special focus is
on the problem of mutual-exclusion and
binding constraints in an RBAC delegation context. Note that in our approach,
conflicts are detected and resolved before
causing an inconsistent RBAC configuration. Thereby, we ensure the continuous
consistency of corresponding processrelated RBAC delegation models.
At the PIM layer, we provide UML
modeling support for the integrated
modeling of business processes and corresponding delegation policies via extended UML Activity diagrams. Moreover, to support the controlled delegation of roles, tasks, and duties at the PSM
layer we implemented our approach as a
delegation extension for the BusinessActivity library and runtime engine, which
is available for download at BAL (2012).
We also performed a case study and conducted interviews to evaluate the practical applicability of our integrated modeling approach on real-world processes.
In our future work, we plan to conduct
further industrial case studies to analyze, for instance, potential issues regarding the complexity and comprehensibility of the graphical syntax of our modeling extension. Moreover, we will investigate how other security-related concepts
can be integrated with the delegation extension. For instance, we intend to integrate our extension with other security extensions, such as the Secure Object Flows (SOF) extension introduced
in Hoisl et al. (2014). Furthermore, we
Business & Information Systems Engineering

plan to use our generic CIM layer model
to extend other process modeling languages (such as BPMN) with a delegation extension and analyze potential differences between different host languages
with respect to these security extensions.
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Abstract
Sigrid Schefer-Wenzl, Mark Strembeck

Modeling Support for
Role-Based Delegation
in Process-Aware Information
Systems
In the paper, an integrated approach
for the modeling and enforcement of
delegation policies in process-aware
information systems is presented. In
particular, a delegation extension for
process-related role-based access control (RBAC) models is speciﬁed. The extension is generic in the sense that it
can be used to extend process-aware
information systems or process modeling languages with support for processrelated RBAC delegation models. Moreover, the detection of delegation-related conﬂicts is discussed and a set
of pre-deﬁned resolution strategies for
each potential conﬂict is provided.
Thereby, the design-time and runtime
consistency of corresponding RBAC delegation models can be ensured. Based
on a formal metamodel, UML2 modeling support for the delegation of
roles, tasks, and duties is provided.
A corresponding case study evaluates
the practical applicability of the approach with real-world business processes. Moreover, the approach is implemented as an extension to the BusinessActivity library and runtime engine.
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